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OpenSpiel is a collection of environments and algorithms for research in general reinforcement learning
and search/planning in games. OpenSpiel supports n-player (single- and multi- agent) zero-sum, cooper-
ative and general-sum, one-shot and sequential, strictly turn-taking and simultaneous-move, perfect and
imperfect information games, as well as traditional multiagent environments such as (partially- and fully-
observable) grid worlds and social dilemmas. OpenSpiel also includes tools to analyze learning dynamics
and other common evaluation metrics. This document serves both as an overview of the code base and an
introduction to the terminology, core concepts, and algorithms across the fields of reinforcement learning,
computational game theory, and search.
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1. OpenSpiel Overview
1.1. Acknowledgments
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see the list of authors on github.
We would also like to thank the following people, who helped and supported the development of
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• Remi Munos
• Michael Bowling
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• Damien Boudot
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1.2. OpenSpiel At a Glance
We provide an intentionally brief overview here. For details, please see Section 3.
OpenSpiel provides a framework for writing games and algorithms and evaluating them on a variety
of benchmark games. OpenSpiel contains implementations of over 20 different games of various sorts
(perfect information, simultaneous move, imperfect information, gridworld games, an auction game,
and several normal-form / matrix games). Game implementations are in C++ and wrapped in Python.
Algorithms are implemented in C++ and/or Python. The API is almost identical in the two languages, so
code can easily be translated if needed. A subset of the library has also been ported to Swift. Most of the
learning algorithms written in Python use Tensorflow [1], though we are actively seeking examples and
other support for PyTorch [61] and JAX1.
OpenSpiel has been tested on Linux and MacOS. There is also limited support on Windows.
Components of OpenSpiel are listed in Tables 1 and 2. As of October 2019, these tables will no longer
be updated: Please refer to the Overview of Implemented Games or the Overview of Implemented
Algorithms pages on the web site for most current information.
1https://github.com/google/jax
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Game Reference(s)
Backgammon Wikipedia
Breakthrough Wikipedia
Bridge bidding Wikipedia
Catch [51] and [59, Appendix A]
Coin Game [64]
Connect Four Wikipedia
Cooperative Box-Pushing [70]
Chess Wikipedia
First-price Sealed-bid Auction Wikipedia
Go Wikipedia
Goofspiel Wikipedia
Hanabi (via HLE) Wikipedia, [7]
Havannah Wikipedia
Hex Wikipedia
Kuhn poker Wikipedia, [38]
Laser Tag [42, 41]
Leduc poker [73]
Liar’s Dice Wikipedia
Markov Soccer [45, 28]
Matching Pennies (three-player) [33]
Matrix Games [71]
Negotiation [43, 20]
Oshi-Zumo [19, 10, 62]
Oware Wikipedia
Pentago Wikipedia
Phantom Tic-Tac-Toe [3, 40, 44]
Pig [56]
Quoridor Wikipedia
Tic-Tac-Toe Wikipedia
Tiny Bridge
Tiny Hanabi [23]
Y Wikipedia
Cliff-Walking (Python-only) [75, Chapter 6]
Table 1 | Game Implementations in OpenSpiel as of October 2019. Please see Overview of Implemented
Games for an up-to-date list.
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Algorithm Category Reference(s)
Minimax (and Alpha-Beta) Search Search Wikipedia, Wikipedia, [34]
Monte Carlo tree search Search Wikipedia, [35, 21, 18]
Lemke-Howson (via nashpy) Opt. [71]
Sequence-form linear programming Opt. [36, 71]
Counterfactual Regret Minimization (CFR) Tabular [86, 55]
CFR against a best responder (CFR-BR) Tabular [32]
Exploitability / Best Response Tabular [86]
External sampling Monte Carlo CFR Tabular [39, 40]
Outcome sampling Monte Carlo CFR Tabular [39, 40]
Q-learning Tabular [75]
Value Iteration Tabular [75]
Advantage Actor-Critic (A2C) RL [50]
Deep Q-networks (DQN) RL [52]
Ephemeral Value Adjustments (EVA) RL [26]
Deep CFR MARL [15]
Exploitability Descent (ED) MARL [46]
(Extensive-form) Fictitious Play (XFP) MARL [29]
Neural Fictitious Self-Play (NFSP) MARL [30]
Neural Replicator Dynamics (NeuRD) MARL [57]
Regret Policy Gradients (RPG, RMPG) MARL [74]
Policy-Space Response Oracles (PSRO) MARL [41]
Q-based “all-action” Policy Gradients (QPG) MARL [76, 63, 74]
Regression CFR (RCFR) MARL [81, 54]
Rectified Nash Response (PSROrN) MARL [4]
α -Rank Eval / Viz [58]
Replicator / Evolutionary Dynamics Eval / Viz [31, 69]
Table 2 | Algorithms Implementated in OpenSpiel as of October 2019. Please see Overview of Implemented
Algorithms for an updated list.
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2. Getting Started
2.1. Getting and Building OpenSpiel
The following commands will clone the repository and build OpenSpiel on Ubuntu or Debian Linux, or
MacOS. There is also limited support for Windows. We now show the fastest way to install OpenSpiel.
Please see the recommended installation instructions using virtualenv for more detail.
sudo apt-get install git cmake g++
git clone https://github.com/deepmind/open_spiel.git
cd open_spiel
./install.sh # Install various dependencies (note: assumes Debian-based distro!)
pip3 install --upgrade -r requirements.txt # Install Python dependencies
mkdir build
cd build
# Note: Python version installed should be >= Python_TARGET_VERSION specified here
CXX=g++ cmake -DPython_TARGET_VERSION=3.6 -DCMAKE_CXX_COMPILER=g++ ../open_spiel
make -j12 # The 12 here is the number of parallel processes used to build
ctest -j12 # Run the tests to verify that the installation succeeded
Note that we have tested OpenSpiel Linux and MacOS, and there is limited support on Windows. Also,
for the case of Linux, some of the scripts and instructions currently assume Debian-based distributions
(i.e. Debian, Ubuntu, etc.). All of the dependencies exist on other distributions, but may have different
names, and package managers differ. Please see install.sh for necessary dependencies.
2.1.1. Setting PYTHONPATH
To be able to import the Python code (both the C++ binding pyspiel and the rest) from any location,
you will need to add to your PYTHONPATH the root directory and the open_spiel directory. Add the
following in your .bashrc or .profile:
# For the Python modules in open_spiel.
export PYTHONPATH=$PYTHONPATH:/<path_to_open_spiel>
# For the Python bindings of Pyspiel
export PYTHONPATH=$PYTHONPATH:/<path_to_open_spiel>/build/python
2.2. Running the First Example
After having built OpenSpiel following Sec 2.1, run the example from the build directory without any
arguments:
examples/example
This prints out a list of registered games and the usage. Now, let’s play a game of Tic-Tac-Toe with
uniform random players:
examples/example --game=tic_tac_toe
Wow – how exhilarating! Now, why not try one of your favorite games?
Note that the structure in the build directory mirrors that of the source, so the example is found in
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open_spiel/examples/example.cc. At this stage you can run one of many binaries created, such as
games/backgammon_test or algorithms/external_sampling_mccfr_test.
Once you have set your PYTHONPATH as explained in Sec 2.1.1, you can similarly run the python
examples:
cd ../open_spiel
python3 python/examples/example.py --game=breakthrough
python3 python/examples/matrix_game_example.py
Nice!
2.3. Adding a New Game
We describe here only the simplest and fastest way to add a new game. It is ideal to first be aware of the
general API, which is described on a high level in Section 3, on github, and via comments in spiel.h.
1. Choose a game to copy from in games/. Suggested games: Tic-Tac-Toe and Breakthrough for
perfect information without chance events, Backgammon or Pig for perfect information games
with chance events, Goofspiel and Oshi-Zumo for simultaneous move games, and Leduc poker and
Liar’s dice for imperfect information games. For the rest of these steps, we assume Tic-Tac-Toe.
2. Copy the header and source: tic_tac_toe.h, tic_tac_toe.cc, and tic_tac_toe_test.cc to
new_game.h, new_game.cc, and new_game_test.cc.
3. Add the new game’s source files to games/CMakeLists.txt.
4. Add the new game’s test target to games/CMakeLists.txt
5. In new_game.h, rename the header guard at the the top and bottom of the file.
6. In the new files, rename the inner-most namespace from tic_tac_toe to new_game
7. In the new files, rename TicTacToeGame and TicTacToeState to NewGameGame and NewGameState
8. At the top of new_game.cc, change the short name to new_game and include the new game’s
header.
9. Add the short name to the list of expected games in python/tests/pyspiel_test.py.
10. You should now have a duplicate game of Tic-Tac-Toe under a different name. It should build and
the test should run, and can be verified by rebuilding and running the example from Section 2.2.
11. Now, change the implementations of the functions in NewGameGame and NewGameState to reflect
your new game’s logic. Most API functions should be clear from the game you copied from. If not,
each API function that is overridden will be fully documented in superclasses in spiel.h. See also
the description of extensive-form games in Section 3.1 which closely matches the API.
12. Once done, rebuild and rerun the tests from Sec 2.1 to ensure everything passes (including your
new game’s test!)
2.4. Adding a New Algorithm
Adding a new algorithm is fairly straight-forward. Like adding a game, it is easiest to copy and start from
one of the existing algorithms. If adding a C++ algorithm, choose one from algorithms/. If adding a
Python algorithm, choose one from python/algorithms/. For appropriate matches, see Table 2.
Unlike games, there is no specific structure or API that must be followed for an algorithm. If the algorithm
is one in a class of existing algorithms, then we advise keeping the style and design similar to the ones
in the same class, re-using function or modules where possible.
The algorithms themselves are not binaries, but classes or functions that can be used externally. The best
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way to show an example of an algorithm’s use is via a test. However, there are also binary executables in
examples/ and python/examples/.
3. Design and API
The purpose of OpenSpiel is to promote general multiagent reinforcement learning across many different
game types, in a similar way as general game-playing [25] but with a heavy emphasis on learning and
not in competition form. We hope that OpenSpiel could have a similar effect on general RL in games as
the Atari Learning Environment [8, 47] has had on single-agent RL.
OpenSpiel provides a general API with a C++ foundation, which is exposed through Python bindings
(via pybind11). Games are written in C++. This allows for fast or memory-efficient implementations of
basic algorithms that might need the efficiency. Some custom RL environments are also implemented in
Python. Most algorithms that require machine learning are implemented in Python.
Above all, OpenSpiel is designed to be easy to install and use, easy to understand, easy to extend
(“hackable”), and general/broad. OpenSpiel is built around two major important design criteria:
1. Keep it simple. Simple choices are preferred to more complex ones. The code should be readable,
usable, extendable by non-experts in the programming language(s), and especially to researchers
from potentially different fields. OpenSpiel provides reference implementations that are used to
learn from and prototype with, rather than fully-optimized / high-performance code that would
require additional assumptions (narrowing the scope / breadth) or advanced (or lower-level)
language features.
2. Keep it light. Dependencies can be problematic for long-term compatibility, maintenance, and
ease-of-use. Unless there is strong justification, we tend to avoid introducing dependencies to keep
things portable and easy to install.
3.1. Extensive-Form Games
There are several formalisms and corresponding research communities for representing multiagent
interactions. It is beyond the scope of this paper to survey the various formalisms, so we describe the
ones most relevant to our implementations. There have been recent efforts to harmonize the terminology
and make useful associations among algorithms between computational game theory and reinforcement
learning [74, 46, 37], so we base our terminology on classical concepts and these recent papers.
Games in OpenSpiel are represented as procedural extensive-form games [60, 71], though in some cases
can also be cyclic such as in Markov Decision Processes [75] and Markov games [45]. We first give the
classical definitions, then describe some extensions, and explain some equivalent notions between the
fields of reinforcement learning and games.
An extensive-form game is a tuple 〈N ,A,H ,Z,u,τ ,S〉, where
• N = {1, 2, . . .n} is a finite set of n players2. There is also a special player c, called chance.
• A is a finite set of actions that players can take. This is a global set of state-independent actions;
generally, only a subset of legal actions are available when agents decide.
• H is a finite set of histories. Each history is a sequence of actions that were taken from the start
of the game.
• Z ⊆ H is a subset of terminal histories that represents a completely played game.
2Note that the player IDs range from 0 to n − 1 in the implementations.
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• u : Z → ∆nu ⊆ <n , where ∆u = [umin,umax], is the utility function assigning each player a utility
at terminal states, and umin,umax are constants representing the minimum and maximum utility.
• τ : H → N is a player identity function; τ (h) identifies which player acts at h.
• S is a set of states. In general, S is a partition ofH such that each state s ∈ S contains histories
h ∈ s that cannot be distinguished by τ (s) = τ (h) where h ∈ s. Decisions are made by players at
these states. There are several ways to precisely define S as described below.
We denote the legal actions available at state s as A(s) ⊆ A. Importantly, a history represents the true
ground/world state: when agents act, they change this history, but depending on how the partition is
chosen, some actions (including chance’s) may be private and not revealed to some players.
We will extend this formalism further on to more easily describe how games are represented in OpenSpiel.
However, we can already state some important categories of games:
• A constant-sum (k-sum) game is one where ∀z ∈ Z,∑i ∈N ui (z) = k.
• A zero-sum game is a constant-sum game with k = 0.
• An identical interest game is one where ∀z ∈ Z,∀i, j ∈ N ,ui (z) = uj (z).
• A general-sum game is one without any constraint on the sum of the utilities.
In other words: k-sum games are strictly competitive, identical interest games are strictly cooperative,
and general-sum games are neither or somewhere in between. Also,
• A perfect information game is one where there is only one history per state: ∀s ∈ S, |s | = 1.
• A imperfect information game is one where there is generally more than one history per state,
∃s ∈ S : |s | > 1.
Chess, Go, and Breakthrough are examples of perfect information games without events (no chance
player). Backgammon and Pig are examples of perfect information games with chance events. Leduc
poker, Kuhn poker, Liar’s Dice, and Phantom Tic-Tac-Toe are examples of imperfect information games.
Every one of these example games is zero-sum.
Definition 1. A chance node (or chance event) is a history h such that τ (h) = c.
In zero-sum perfect information games, minimax and alpha-beta search are classical search algorithms
for making decisions using heuristic value functions [34]. The analogs for perfect information games
with chance events are expectiminimax [49] and *-minimax [6].
3.1.1. Extension: Simultaneous-Move Games
We can augment the extensive-form game with a special kind of player, the simultaneous move player:
÷. When τ (s) = ÷, each player i has a set of legal actions Ai (s), and all players act simultaneously
choosing a joint action a = (ai ){i ∈N}. Histories in these games are then sequences of joint actions, and
transitions take the form (h,a,h′). The rest of the properties from extensive-form games still hold.
Definition 2. A normal-form (or one-shot game) is a simultaneous-move game with a single state, |S | = 1.
A matrix game is a normal-form game where |N | = 2.
Fact 1. A simultaneous-move game can be represented as a specific type of extensive-form game with imperfect
information.
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To see why this is true: consider the game of Rock, Paper, Scissors (A = {r, p, s}) where each player
chooses a single action, revealing their choice simultaneously. An equivalent turn-based is the following:
the first player writes their action on a piece of paper, and places it face down. Then, the second player
does the same. Then, the choices are revealed simultaneously. The players acted at separate times, but
the second player did not know the choice made by the first player (and hence could be in one of three
histories: h = r,h = p, or h = s), and the game has two states instead of one state. In a game with
many states, the same idea can simply be repeated for every state.
Why, then, represent these games differently? There are several reasons:
1. They have historically been treated as separate in the multiagent RL literature.
2. They can sometimes be solved using Bellman-style dynamic programming, unlike general imperfect
information games.
3. They are slightly more general. In fact, one can represent a turn-based game using a simultaneous-
move game, simply by setting Ai (s) = ∅ for j , τ (s) or by adding a special pass move as the only
legal action when it is not a player’s turn.
We elaborate on each of these points in the following section, when we relate simultaneous-move games
to existing multiagent RL formalisms.
3.1.2. Policies, Objectives, and Multiagent Reinforcement Learning
We now add the last necessary ingredients for designing decision-making and learning algorithms, and
bring in the remaining standard RL terms.
Definition 3. A policy pi : S → ∆(A(s)), where ∆(X ) represents the set of probability distributions over
X , describes agent behavior. An agent acts by selecting actions from its policy: a ∼ pi . A deterministic
policy is one where at each state the distribution over actions has probability 1 on one action and zero on
the others. A policy that is not (necessarily) deterministic is called stochastic.
In games, the chance player is special because it always plays with a fixed (stochastic) policy pic .
Definition 4. A transition function T : S × A → ∆(S) defines a probability distribution over successor
states s ′ when choosing action a from state s.
Fact 2. A transition function can be equivalently represented using intermediate chance nodes between the
histories of the predecessor and successor states h ∈ s and h′ ∈ s ′. The transition function is then determined
by pic and Pr(h |s).
Definition 5. A player, or agent, has perfect recall if, the state does not lose the information about the past
decisions made by the player. Formally, all histories h ∈ s, contain the same sequence of action of the current
player: let SAHisti (h) be the history of only player i ’s state-action pairs (s,a) experienced along h. Player i
has perfect recall if for all s ∈ {s | s ∈ S,τ (s) = i}, and all h,h′ ∈ s, SAHisti (h) = SAHisti (h′).
In Poker, a player acts from an information state, and the histories corresponding to such an information
state only differ in the chance event outcomes that correspond to the opponent’s private cards. In these
partially-observable games, a state is normally called an information state to emphasize the fact that
the agent’s perception of the state (s) is different than the true underlying world state (one of h ∈ s).
The property of perfect recall turns out to be a very important criterion for determining convergence
guarantees for exact tabular algorithms, as we show in Section 3.2.
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Definition 6. An observation is a partial view of the information state and contains strictly less information
than the information state. To be valid, the sequence of observations and actions of all players should contain
at least as much information as the information state. Formally: Let Ω be a finite set of observations. Let
Oi : S → Ω be an observation function for player i and denote oi (s) as the observation. As s contains
histories h, we will write oi (h) = oi (s) if h ∈ s. A valid observation is such that the function h → (oi (h′))h′@h
defines a partition of the history spaceH that is a sub-partition of S.
In a multiplayer game, we define a per-step reward to player i for a transition as ri (s,a, s ′), with
r (s,a, s ′) representing the vector of returns to all players. In most OpenSpiel games, these r (s,a, s ′) =
0 until s ′ is terminal, ending the episode, and these values are obtained by State::Rewards and
State::PlayerReward function called on s ′. Player interaction over an episode generates a trajectory
ρ = (s0,a0, s1, · · · ) whose length is |ρ |. We define a return to player i as дρt,i =
∑ |ρ |−1
t ′≥t ri (st ′,at ′, st ′+1)
with дρt representing a vector of rewards to all players as with per-step rewards. In OpenSpiel, the
State::Returns function provides дρ0 and State::PlayerReturn provides д
ρ
0,i . Note that we do not
use a discount factor when defining rewards here because most games are episodic; learning agents are
free to discount rewards however they like, if necessary. Note also that the standard (undiscounted)
return is the random variable Gt .
Each agent’s objective is to maximize its own return, G0,i or an expected return Ez∼pi [G0, i]. However,
note that the trajectory sampled depends not just on player i ’s policy but on every other player’s policies!
So, an agent cannot maximize its return in isolation: it must consider the other agents as part of its
optimization problem. This is fundamentally different from traditional (single-agent) reinforcement
learning, and the main challenge of multiagent RL.
3.2. Algorithms and Results
3.2.1. Basic Algorithms
Suppose players are playing with a joint policy pi . The expected returns algorithm computes Epi [G0,i ] for
all players i ∈ N exactly, by doing a tree traversal over the game and querying the policy at each state s.
Similarly, for small enough games, one can get all the states (S) in a game by doing a tree traversal and
indexing each state by its information state string description.
The trajectories algorithms run a batch of episodes by following a joint policy pi , collecting various data
such as the states visited, state policies, actions sampled, returns, episode lengths, etc., which could form
the basis of the data collection for various RL algorithms.
There is a simple implementation of value iteration. In single-agent games, it is identical to the standard
algorithm [75]. In two-player turn-taking zero-sum games, the values for state s, i.e. V (s), is stored in
view of the player to play at s, i.e. Vτ (s)(s). This can be solved by applying the identities V1(s) = −V2(s)
and r1(s,a, s ′) = −r2(s,a, s ′).
3.2.2. Search Algorithms
There are two classical search algorithms for zero-sum turn-taking games of perfect information: minimax
(and alpha-beta) search [34, 67], and Monte Carlo tree search (MCTS) [21, 35, 18].
Suppose one wants to choose at some root state sroot : given a heuristic value function for v0,i (s)
(representing the value of state s to player i) and some depth d, minimax search computes a policy
pi (s) that assigns 1 to an action that maximizes the following depth-limited adversarial multistep value
11
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backup:
vd (s) =

v0,τ sroot (s) if d = 0;
maxa∈A(s)vd−1(T (s,a)) if τ (s) = i;
mina∈A(s)vd−1(T (s,a)) if τ (s) , i,
where here we treat T(s,a) = s ′ as a deterministic map for the successor state reached from taking
action a in state s.
The Python implementation of minimax includes expectiminimax [49] as well, which also backs up
expected values at chance nodes. Alpha-beta style cut-offs could also be applied using ∗-minimax [6],
but it is not currently implemented.
The implementations of MCTS are vanilla UCT with random playouts. Chance node are supported and
represented explicitly in the tree: at chance nodes, the tree policy is always to sample according to the
chance node’s probability distibution.
3.2.3. Optimization Algorithms
OpenSpiel includes some basic optimization algorithms applied to games, such as solving zero-sum
matrix games ([71, Section 4], [45]) and sequence-form linear programming for two-player zero-sum
extensive-form games ([36] and [71, Section 5]), and an algorithm to check whether an action is
dominated by a mixture of other strategies in a normal-form [71, Sec 4.5.2].
3.2.4. Traditional Single-Agent RL Algorithms
We currently have three algorithms usable for traditional (single-agent) RL: Deep Q-Networks (DQN) [52],
Advantage Actor-Critic (A2C) [50], and Ephemeral Value Adjustments (EVA) [26]. Each algorithm will
operate as the standard one in single-agent environments.
Each of these algorithms can also be run in the multiagent setting, in various ways. The default is
that each player is independently running a copy of the algorithm with states and observations that
include what other players did. The other way to use these algorithms is to compute an approximate
best response to a fixed set of other players’ policies, described in Section 3.2.5.
The main difference between the implementations of these algorithms and other standard ones is that
these are aware that only a subset of actions are legal / illegal. So, for example, in Q-learning the value
update for a transition (s,a, s ′) and policy updates are:
Q(s,a) ← Q(s,a) + α(r + γ max
a′∈A(s ′)
Q(s ′,a′) −Q(s,a)), (1)
pi (s,a) =

0 if a < A(s);
1 − ϵ + ϵ|A(s) | if a = argmaxa′∈A(s)Q(s,a′);
ϵ
|A(s) | otherwise.
(2)
Note that the actions are in the set of legal actionsA(s) andA(s ′) rather than assuming that every action
is legal at every state. For policy gradient methods, a masked softmax is used to set the logits of the
illegal actions to −∞ to force the policy to sets probability zero to illegal actions.
3.2.5. Partially-Observable (Imperfect Information) Games
There are many algorithms for reinforcement learning in partially-observable (zero-sum) games, as this
is the focus of the core team’s research interests.
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Best Response and NashConv
Suppose pi is a joint policy. A best response policy for player i is a policy that maximized player i ’s
return against the other players’ policies (pi−i). There may be many best responses, and we denote the
set of such best responses,
BR(pi−i ) = {pi ′i | pi ′i = argmax
pii
ui (pii ,pi−i )}.
Let δi (pi ) be the incentive for player i to deviate to one of its best responses: δi (pi ) = ui (pibi ,pi−i ) −ui (pi ),
where pibi ∈ BR(pi−i ). An approximate ϵ-Nash equilibrium is a joint policy such that δi (pi ) ≤ ϵ for all
i ∈ N , where a Nash equilibrium is obtained at ϵ = 0.
A common metric for determining the rates of convergence (to equilibria) of algorithms in practice is:
NashConv(pi ) =
∑
i ∈N
δi (pi ).
In two-player constant-sum (i.e. k-sum) games, a similar metric has been used:
Exploitability(pi ) = NashConv(pi )|N | =
∑
i ∈N δi (pi )
n
=
u1(pib1 ,pi2) + u2(pi1,pib2 ) − k
2
,
where pibi ∈ BR(pi−i ). Nash equilibria are often considered optimal in two-player zero-sum games,
because they guarantee maximal worst-case returns against any other opponent policy. This is also true
for approximate equilibria, so convergence to equilibra has been a focus in this class of games.
Fictitious Play and Best Response-Based Iterative Algorithms
Fictitious play (FP) is a classic iterative procedure for computing policies in (normal-form) games [14, 65].
Starting with a uniform random policy at time t = 0. Then, for t ∈ {1, 2, · · · }, do:
1. Each player computes a best response to the opponents’ average policy: pi ti ∈ BR(pi t−1−i ).
2. Each player updates their average policy: pi ti =
(t−1)pi t−1i +pi ti
t .
OpenSpiel has an implementation of extensive-form fictitious play (XFP) [29], which is equivalent
to the classical fictitious play. To run it on normal-form games, the game needs to be transformed
into a turn-based game using TurnBasedSimultaneousGame in game_transforms/. Fictitious Self-Play
is a sampled-based RL version of XFP that uses supervised learning to learn the average policy and
reinforcement learning to compute approximate best responses. Neural Fictitious Self-Play (NFSP) scales
these ideas using neural networks and a reservoir-sampled buffer to maintain a uniform sample of
experience to train the average policy [30].
The average policy in fictitious play can be described equivalently as a meta-policy that assigns uniform
weight over all the previous best response policies, and each iteration computes a best response to
the opponents’ meta-policies. Policy-Space Response Oracles (PSRO) generalizes fictitious play and
the double-oracle algorithm [41, 48] by analyzing this meta-game using empirical game-theoretic
analysis [82]. Exploitabiliy Descent replaces the second step of fictitious play with a policy gradient
ascent against the state-action values given the opponents play their best responses [46]. This one change
allows convergence of the policies themselves rather than having to maintain an average policy; in
addition, it makes the optimization of the polices amenable to RL-style general function approximation.
A convergence curve for XFP and ED are shown in Figure 1. A convergence curve for NFSP in 2-player
Leduc is found below (Figure 3), included with the policy gradient methods.
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Figure 1 | Convergence rates of XFP and ED algorithms on various partially-observable games in OpenSpiel.
The units of the x -axis is iterations and the units of the y-axis is NashConv. Figure taken from [46].
Counterfactual Regret Minimization
Counterfactual regret (CFR) minimization is a policy iteration algorithm for computing approximate
equilibra in two-player zero-sum games [86]. It has revolutionized Poker AI research [66, 68], lead-
ing to the largest variants of poker being solved and competitive polices that have beat top human
professionals [12, 53, 16, 17].
CFR does two main things: (a) define a new notion of state-action value, the counterfactual value, and
(b) define a decomposed regret minimization procedure (based on these values) at every information
state that, together, leads to minimization of overall average regret. This means that the average policy
of two CFR players approaches an approximate equilibrium.
DefineZ(s) as the set of terminal histories that pass through s, paired with the prefix of each terminal
14
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h @ z. Define a reach probability ηpi (h) to be the product of all players’ probabilities of state-action pairs
along h (including chance’s), which can be decomposed into player i ’s contribution and their opponents’
contributions: ηpi (h) = ηpii (h)ηpi−i (h). Similarly define ηpi (h, z) similarly from h to z and ha as the history
h appended with action a. The counterfactual state-action value for i = τ (s) is:
qcpi ,i (s,a) =
∑
(h,z)∈Z(s)
ηpi−i (h)ηpi (ha, z)ui (z).
The state value is then vcpi ,i (s) =
∑
h∈s pi (s,a)qcpi ,i (s,a).
CFR starts with a uniform random policy pi 0 and proceeds by applying regret minimization at every
information state independently. Define r t (s,a) = qcpi t ,i (s,a) −vcpi t ,i (s) to be the instantaneous counter-
factual regret. CFR proceeds by minimizing this regret, typically using regret-matching [27]. A table of
cumulative regret is maintained Rt (s,a) = ∑t r t (s,a), and the policy at each state is updated using:
pi t+1(s,a) =

Rt,+(s,a)∑
a∈A(s ) Rt,+(s,a) if the denominator is positive;
1
|A(s) | otherwise,
where x+ = max(x , 0).
In addition to basic CFR, OpenSpiel contains a few variants of Monte Carlo CFR [39] such as outcome
sampling and external sampling, and CFR+ [77].
Regression CFR
Regression CFR (RCFR) was the first variant to combine RL-style function approximation with CFR tech-
niques [81, 54]. The main idea is to train a regressor to predict the cumulative or average counterfactual
regrets, Rˆt (s,a) ≈ Rt (s,a) or r¯ ′t (s,a) ≈ Rt (s,a)/t , instead of reading them from a table. The original
paper used domain-specific features and regression trees. The implementation in OpenSpiel uses neural
networks with raw inputs obtained by each game’s InformationSetAsNormalizedVector bit string.
Figure 2 shows the convergence rate of RCFR compared to a tabular CFR.
Deep CFR [15] applies these ideas to a significantly larger game using convolutional networks, external
sampling Monte Carlo CFR, and–like NFSP–a reservoir-sampled buffer.
Regret Policy Gradients
Value-based RL algorithms, such as temporal-difference learning and Q-learning, evaluate a policy pi by
computing or estimating state (or state-action) values that represent the expected return conditioned on
having reached state s,
vpi (st ) = Epi [Gt |St = s].
Policies are improved by choosing the actions that lead to higher-valued states or higher-valued returns.
In episodic partially-observable games, when agents have perfect recall (Def 5), there is an important
connection between traditional values in value-based RL and counterfactual values [74, Section 3.2]:
vpi ,i (s) =
vcpi ,i (s)
β−i (pi , s) ,
where β−i (s) = ∑h∈s ηpi−i (h) is the Bayes normalization term to ensure that Pr(h |s) is a probability
distribution. CFR is then as a (tabular) all-actions policy gradient algorithm with generalized infinitesimal
gradient ascent (GIGA) at each state [74], inspiring new RL variants for partially observable games.
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Figure 2 | Convergence rate of RCFR in Leduc poker using a 2-layer network with 400 hidden units
in each layer. The average policy is computed exactly (i.e. tabular), and regression targets are the
cumulative predicted regrets.
These variants: Q-based “all-actions” Policy Gradient (QPG), Regret Policy Gradients (RPG), and Regret-
Matching Policy Gradients (RMGP) are included in OpenSpiel, along with classic batched A2C. RPG
differs from QPG in that the policy is optimized toward a no-regret region, minimizing the loss based
on r+(s,a), the motivation being that a policy with zero regret is, by definition, an equilibrium policy.
Convergence results for these algorithms are show in Figure 3.
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Figure 3 | Convergence rates of NFSP and various (regret-based) policy gradient algorithms in 2-player
Leduc poker. Each line is an average over the top five seeds and hyperparemeter settings for each
algorithm. The lowest (around 0.2) NashConv value reached by any individual run is depicted by a
dashed line.
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Neural Replicator Dynamics
Neural Replicator Dynamics (NeuRD) [57] takes the policy gradient connection to CFR a step further:
in [74], the relationship between policy gradients and CFR was possible via GIGA [85]; however, this
requires `2 projections of policies after the gradient step. NeuRD, on the other hand, works directly
with the common softmax-based policy representations. Instead of differentiating through the softmax
as policy gradient does, NeuRD differentiates only with respect to the logits. This is equivalent to
updating the policy of a parameterized replicator dynamics from evolutionary game theory [31, 69]
using an Euler discretization. The resulting update reduces to the well-known multiplicative weights
update algorithm or Hedge [24], which minimizes regret. Hence, NeuRD in partially-observable games
can replace regret-matching in CFR and retain convergence guarantees in the tabular case since that
algorithm reduces to CFR with Hedge.
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Figure 4 | NashConv of tabular all-actions NeuRD versus tabular all-action policy gradient (policy gradient
policy iteration) in Leduc poker. Figure taken from [57].
One practical benefit is that the NeuRD policy updates are not weighted by the policy like policy gradient
is. As a result, in non-stationary domains, NeuRD is also more adaptive to changes in the environment.
Results for NeuRD are show in Figures 4 and 5.
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Figure 5 | NashConv of NeuRD using sampling trajectories and function approximation. The games are
played in three phases where, between phases, the returns are inverted. NeuRD is the yellow (bottom)
line, which policy gradient is the blue (top) line. Figure taken from [57].
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3.3. Tools and Evaluation
OpenSpiel has a few tools for visualization and evaluation, though some would also be considered
algorithms (such as α -Rank). The best response algorithm is also a tool in some sense, but is listed in
Section 2 due to its association with partially-observable games.
For now, all the tools and evaluation we mention in this section is contained under the python/egt and
python/visualizations subdirectories of the code base.
3.3.1. Visualizing a Game Tree
A game tree can be visualized by using Graphviz. An example is shown in Fig 6.
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Figure 6 | A visualization of Kuhn poker generated by python/examples/visualization_example.py.
Black, blue, and red edges correspond to chance, first player, and second player outcomes/actions,
respectively. Nodes correspond to histories h and are labeled by their information state strings, and
dotted boxes group these histories h ∈ s by their information state s. Diamonds correspond to terminal
states which are labeled by the utility to the first player.
3.3.2. Visualization of Evolutionary and Policy Learning Dynamics
One common visualization tool in the multiagent learning literature (especially in games) is a phase
portrait that shows a vector field and/or trajectories of particle that depict local changes to the policy
under specific update dynamics [72, 80, 13, 79, 11, 82, 2, 84, 83, 9, 78].
For example, consider the well-known single-population replicator dynamic for symmetric games, where
each player follows a learning dynamic described by:
∂pit (a)
∂t
= pit (a) (u(a,pit ) − u¯(pit )) ∀a ∈ A,
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where u(a,pit ) represents the expected utility of playing action a against the full policy pit , and u¯(pit ) is
the expected value over all actions
∑
a∈A pit (a)u(a,pit ).
Figure 7 shows plots generated from OpenSpiel for replicator dynamics in the game of Rock–Paper–
Scissors. Figure 8 shows plots generated from OpenSpiel for four common bimatrix games.
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Figure 7 | Phase portraits of single-population replicator dynamics in Rock–Paper–Scissors. The colored
plot shows the relative magnitude of the dynamics.
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Figure 8 | Phase portraits of the two-population replicator dynamics for four common bimatrix games.
The colored plots shows the relative magnitude of the vectors.
3.3.3. α -Rank
α -Rank [58] is an algorithm that leverages evolutionary game theory to rank AI agents interacting in
multiplayer games. Specifically, α -Rank defines a Markov transition matrix with states corresponding to
the profile of agents being used by the players (i.e., tuples of AI agents), and transitions informed by a
specific evolutionary model that ensures correspondence of the rankings to a game-theoretic solution
concept known as a Markov-Conley Chain. A key benefit of α -Rank is that it can rank agents in scenarios
involving intransitive agent relations (e.g., the agents Rock, Paper, and Scissors in the eponymous game),
unlike the Elo rating system [5]; an additional practical benefit is that it is also tractable to compute in
general games, unlike ranking systems relying on Nash equilibria [22].
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OpenSpiel currently supports using α -Rank for both single-population (symmetric) and multi-population
games. Specifically, users may specify games via payoff tables (or tensors for the >2 players case) as
well as Heuristic Payoff Tables (HPTs). Note that here we only include an overiew of the technique and
visualizations; for a tour through the usage and code please see the α -Rank doc on the web site.
Figure 9(a) shows a visualization of the Markov transition matrix of α -Rank run on the Rock, Paper,
Scissors game. The next example demonstrates computing α -Rank on an asymmetric 3-player meta-game,
constructed by computing utilities for Kuhn poker agents from the best response policies generated in
the first few rounds of via extensive-form fictitious play (XFP) [29]. The result is shown in Figure 9(b).
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Figure 9 | (a) Markov transitions matrix of solution found by α -Rank on Rock, Paper, Scissors. (b) Markov
transitions matrix of meta-game computed by the first few rounds of XFP in 3-player Kuhn poker.
One may choose to conduct a sweep over the ranking-intensity parameter, α (as opposed to choosing a
fixed α). This is, in general, useful for general games where bounds on utilities may be unknown, and
where the ranking computed byα -Rank should use a sufficiently high value ofα (to ensure correspondence
to the underlying Markov-Conley Chain solution concept). In such cases, the following interface can
be used to both visualize the sweep and obtain the final rankings computed. The result is shown in
Figure 10.
4. Guide to Contributing
If you are looking for ideas on potential contributions or want to see a rough road map for the future of
OpenSpiel, please visit the Roadmap and Call for Contributions on github.
Before making a contribution to OpenSpiel, please read the design philosophy in Section 3. We also
kindly request that you contact us before writing any large piece of code, in case (a) we are already
working on it and/or (b) it’s something we have already considered and may have some design advice
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Figure 10 | Effect of ranking-intensity parameter α on policy mass in stationary distribution in meta-game
generated by XFP in 3-player Kuhn poker.
on its implementation. Please also note that some games may have copyrights which could require legal
approval(s). Otherwise, happy hacking!
4.1. Contacting Us
If you would like to contact us regarding anything related to OpenSpiel, please create an issue on the
github site so that the team is notified, and so that the responses are visible to everyone.
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